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Roots of Conflict: A Multi-level Analysis of the South Atlantic War of 1982 
 
On 2 April 1982, the Argentinian military had invaded and occupied a series of 
islands known as the Islas Malvinas, or Falkland Islands.*  Subsequently, The United 
Kingdom had responded with a counter-invasion and occupation in an effort to deny the 
Argentinian claim of sovereignty over the archipelago.  After nearly two months and combat 
casualties in excess of a thousand soldiers the British military was able to negate the 
Argentinian success and assert its own sovereignty over the disputed territories.  While the 
outcome of the dispute is clear, the impetus for its initiation is somewhat murky.  This paper 
will attempt to highlight the various theoretical arguments that claim to explain the origin of 
the crisis.  In order to accomplish this task, several levels of analysis will be explored.  Such 
an approach will look at the individual, group, state, and systemic explanations of the 
conflict.   
Historical Context: Sovereign Claims and Counter-claims 
 In order to discuss the Twentieth Century conflagration it is useful to understand the 
historically relevant background from which it was derived.  Perhaps the genesis of the 
dispute could be said to have evolved out of an inter-imperialist struggle; that between Spain 
and Great Britain in the latter third of the Eighteenth Century.  After a series of back-and-
forth claims over the islands between the two imperial antagonists, the Spanish had 
                                                             
* The terms Falkland Islands (the British term) and Islas Malvinas (the Argentinian term) are hereinafter 
referenced in a combined fashion as the Falklands/Malvinas.  The war itself will be referenced in a neutral 
fashion as the South Atlantic War. 
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eventually discontinued its South American imperial pursuits.  From the end of Spanish rule 
in 1811 through 1829 no Spanish claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands had been 
made; however, the British claims persisted.  From 1820 to 1829, the incipient Argentinian 
state (the United Provinces) had occupied the Falklands/Malvinas chain and at the end of the 
nine years had made a counter-claim to sovereignty (Freedman, 1982: 197).           
 Although the British had protested the Argentinian claim to the Falklands/Malvinas, 
the events of 1831-1833 between the United States and Argentina had provided an 
opportunity for clarification.  The mission of the frigate Heroina, commanded by Colonel 
Daniel Jewitt, was to assert Argentinian sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.  His 
mission proved impossible, as his claims to jurisdiction were viewed to be lacking authority 
by the many foreigners (mostly Americans) who had been engaged in the commerce of 
sealing and whaling on the islands.  Following Jewitt’s misadventure, Argentinian 
“sovereignty” was passed in part to one Louis Vernet (a German-born naturalized 
Argentinian citizen) in 1828.  By 1829, Vernet was able to secure the title of “commandant 
of the territory” and subsequently made it known that all further commerce would not be 
permitted in the area (Klafter, 1984: 399).  The U.S. government had taken notice, but not 
action. 
 During the period 1830-31 Vernet and his cohort, Matthew Brisbane, had captured 
three U.S. vessels: The Harriet, The Superior, and The Breakwater.  The local American 
Consul to the government of Buenos Aires, George W. Slacum, had passionately protested 
such actions, as well as the imprisonment of the American captains and crews.  The 
protestation on behalf of the American citizens was granted a deaf audience with the 
Argentinians, who were unmoved and uninterested; even though the Americans were 
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interned within the boundaries of Argentina proper.  Additionally, the assertion of 
Argentinian sovereignty over the island was at minimum tacitly conveyed to the Consul, and 
consequently to the United States (Klafter, 1984: 401- 411).   
Following Argentina’s contention that the episode was a private –rather than a 
diplomatic –affair, American President Andrew Jackson had decidedly committed to 
resolving the matter through “gunboat diplomacy” (Klafter, 1984: 412).  Eventually, the 
piratical pair –Vernet and Brisbane –were ousted and then imprisoned by the American war 
sloop, The Lexington, and her crew of Marines.  The Falkland islands were evacuated of most 
criminal elements (Vernet and Brisbane had commanded a small force of prisoners from 
Buenos Aires) and the status of the island chain was declared by America to be open for 
business.  Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the U.S. were then severed from 1832 
until 1847.  In the meantime, the British had returned to fill the power vacuum on the 
Falklands/Malvinas.  The American response was silence. 
The key lesson of the episode lies in the Argentine position and concomitant logic.  
According to Klafter, the new leader at the time, Juan Manuel de Rosas, had viewed the 
political turmoil of the time to be the result of “foreign intervention” (1984: 416).  This 
assertion must be weighed against the backdrop of the various wars that the nascent 
Argentine Republic was either actively fighting or concluding at the time.  It seems plausible 
that in order to consolidate domestic power through pronouncements that resonated with the 
public, Rosas may have needed to play on the fears of the public in an effort to gain 
solidarity.  Perhaps his calculus had included standing up to a superior foreign naval power 
(the U.S.) at the expense of losing any potential military confrontation, with a view toward 
the prospective benefit of domestic support.  Therefore, one could tentatively say that 
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Argentina’s actions in the period 1831-1833 may be explained by the individual level of 
analysis.   
The 1982 South Atlantic War** 
 For decades preceding the 1982 South Atlantic War, Great Britain and Argentina had 
been engaged in talks mediated by both the United Nations and the United States concerning 
the status of the Falklands/Malvinas.  A mutual agreement regarding sovereignty was never 
fully achieved.  On 19 March 1982, several Argentine scrap merchants had arrived on South 
Georgia Island (a dependency of the Falklands/Malvinas that lay approximately 1400 miles 
east of Argentina) on a private commercial expedition, without the consultation of the British 
government (whose South Atlantic claims extended to the island).  The men had triggered 
British ire when they raised the Argentine flag on the island.   
Following the escalatory event and consequent British condemnation, the British ship 
Endurance had departed the Falklands/Malvinas with its destination being South Georgia 
Island.  Two days later, an Argentine naval fleet set sail for the Falklands/Malvinas.  The 
crisis had entered a new phase; the potential for armed conflict was now more palpable.   
The Argentine invasion had experienced no opposition upon landing on the islands.  
During the course of the following weeks both parties sought a peaceful resolution, while 
simultaneously ratcheting up the force behind their diplomacy: the machines of war.  As 
American shuttle diplomacy, UN mediation, and even Papal consultation were proving 
ineffective, the British had recaptured South Georgia Island on 25 April, as a Task Force 
                                                             
** All statements of fact regarding dates, places, public pronouncements and events are drawn from both 
newspaper reports of the time and from the literary sources indicated in the “works cited” section at the 
conclusion of this paper.  If a “fact” was in dispute amongst the sources it will be noted; however, if not noted 
the assumption should be that there is general factual consensus.   
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headed for the Falklands/Malvinas.   By 29 April, the British had initiated a naval blockade 
around the disputed islands.  On 1 May, the British invasion was initiated.  Numerous naval 
battles had caused ships of both belligerents to be sunk (along with the attendant death and 
injuries that are naturally unavoidable).  By 14 June, combat operations ceased and the 
British had reigned victorious over the Argentinians.   
Why War? 
 At first glance it would appear that war was brought on by grave miscalculations and 
failed diplomacy, and had concluded as a result of an overall mismatch between military 
forces.  This would not only be an oversimplified assessment, but a misguided approach to 
understanding why war had been chosen as a means to settle a dispute.  In order to analyze 
the causes of war it is necessary to summarize a few competing theories that seek to explain 
its origins.  At the same time this endeavor will include the placement of the arguments 
within the context of the levels of analysis that this paper intends to compare and assess.     
Diversionary War 
 Amy Oakes (2006) has posited that the South Atlantic War was a result of the 
Argentinian leadership’s desire to divert attention away from the domestic unrest that was 
teeming at the time.  While she is not alone in her claim, her reasoning is unique in that she 
uses what she calls an “alternative policies approach” in explaining the decision-making 
process leading to war.  Though the Argentine economy was spiraling toward collapse, 
demands for more political freedoms were being made publicly and ferociously, and protests 
regarding the disappearance of thousands of citizens were becoming more prominent, the 
Argentine leadership did not select a diversionary war as its primary optimal solution.  
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Rather, as Oakes contends, the Galtieri government had been compelled to choose from 
among three policy responses to domestic unrest: (1) economic and/or political reform, (2) 
repression, (3) diversionary war. 
 Of the three policy options before Argentina, Oakes claims that though either of the 
first two were preferable, they were not practicable.  The reason she gives is that the state’s 
extractive capacity was declining steadily.  That is, “The junta’s inability to extract resources 
hindered its capacity to respond to the unrest: it could not adopt costly measures, such as 
meaningful economic reforms, sustained repression, or a full-scale war” (Oakes, 452).  The 
option for “full-scale war” is a reference to the idea that the British were believed not to be 
committed to going to war over the Falklands/Malvinas.  Therefore, the idea of a limited 
campaign with little British opposition seemed most probable in producing the desired 
territorial gain with minimal or no costs to bear.  At least, insofar as Oakes asserts, the costs 
would be less than those of repression of the opposition, or economic reform. 
 The perception that the U.K. would not dedicate its military resources in the 
necessary quantity and quality to expel the Argentinians stemmed from a few assumptions.  
First, the British ship HMS Endurance that was docked in the Falklands/Malvinas was slated 
for removal and retirement as announced by the U.K. in 1981.  The departure of the HMS 
Endurance would have signaled that had the British desired to maintain an armed presence in 
the South Atlantic they would not be withdrawing the last remaining implement of force.  
Jack Levy considers this matter to be rather central in understanding the role of 
misperceiving one’s adversary’s intent: 
The British announcement of the withdrawal of the HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic 
in 1981 provides an example [of a deterrence-undermining display of weakness or lack of 
commitment].  The decision can be explained by budgetary constraints, factored problems, 
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and the outcome of a bureaucratic struggle between the Defense Minister and Foreign 
Secretary.  It was perceived by the Argentines as a deliberate strategic decision and 
interpreted as an indication of British unwillingness to use force to defend the 
Falklands/Malvinas.  This was a critical misperception contributing to the outbreak of war 
(Levy, 1986: 214; fn. 41).   
 
 
Oakes claims the same causal logic (2006: 455- 457), as did much of the press at the 
time.  The other assumptions that appeared to have been active at the time imply 
misperceptions, yet they stem from systemic, dyadic and state level forces.  First, from the 
standpoint of the geopolitics, the Reagan administration had appeared more supportive of the 
Argentine junta as a result of their elimination of communist subversives during their “dirty 
war” (President Carter had enforced an arms embargo as a result of the human rights 
violations associated with the very same “dirty war”).  Secondly, that the U.K. did not signal 
strongly their intent to use force to retain the Falklands/Malvinas was perhaps not very 
helpful in deescalating the potential for armed conflict.  Thirdly, as attempts at economic 
reforms by the Galtieri regime had already failed and as the repression efforts at silencing the 
opponents of military rule became more anger-producing and less affordable the available 
policy options were increasingly constraining (2006: 456- 460).    
One more consideration, and one that could be categorized as an accurate perception 
was that of culture.  The manner in which the Falklands/Malvinas dispute was taught to 
Argentine schoolchildren had the intended effect of etching the matter into the psyche of 
Argentine identity.  This would play into the regime’s hand, as protests after the invasion 
were less about the long list of grievances and more about being supportive of the 
government’s seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas.  Even political opponents and labor activists 
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were cheering the government instead of engaging in the standard oppositional issuance of 
complaints (Oakes, 2006: 460). 
  In essence, Amy Oakes argues that the menu of policy alternatives before the 
Argentine military junta were all less than attractive in terms of a risk-benefit calculus.  
However, when faced with an untenable situation the need to find a rallying point for the 
citizenry to gather around had induced the regime to consider an external objective.  
Ultimately, the foreign military misadventure had only proven to be catastrophic.   
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it is implied that many levels of analysis 
may tend to explain some aspect of causality.  However, if one were to consider the totality 
of argumentation that Oakes presents it would likely produce the following assessment: the 
state level of analysis is most explicative in that the misperception of the enemy’s course of 
action would necessarily have to have been shared among the junta (read: group).   This 
assessment is further bolstered by the assertion that the menu for policy choice existed as a 
response to the state’s inability to resolve domestic matters of contention.  The systemic level 
of analysis only serves to reinforce that of the state-level explanation in that its explanatory 
power is halted when considering the possible outcome of a full-scale war, absent the 
assumption that the British would acquiesce.  
      While diversionary war theory seems to have some explanatory power, Mitchell 
and Prins (2004) issue the caveat that in a dyadic relationship where an enduring rivalry 
between a democratic and nondemocratic set of adversaries are experiencing domestic 
economic difficulties the nondemocratic state is more likely to opt for a diversionary war.  
They base their research on a quantitative analysis, along with the explanation that the 
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politically transparent nature of the democratic state does not allow for seizing the 
opportunity to divert.  In a nondemocratic state, the same opportunity appears to be easier to 
take advantage of.    
An Alternative Explanation 
 The foregoing was an analysis of one scholar’s assessment.  In the interest of the 
social science process, it will now be exposed to an alternative line of argument.  John 
Arquilla and Maria Moyano Rasmusssen (2001) present a strong case for debunking what are 
perhaps the two most prominent explanations for the South Atlantic War of 1982.  First, they 
argue that the diversionary war theory is not as applicable as it may appear.  Second, they 
argue that the mutual misperceptions between the belligerent parties that led to an unwanted 
war is also problematic.  Instead, they claim that the reigning junta had been able to take 
advantage of the fear that it instilled in the population during the “dirty war”, initiated in 
1976.  The fearful conditions had resulted in the “demobilisation of civil society”, which in 
turn allowed the junta to rule, absent any popular support (Arquilla and Rasmussen, 2001: 
739-748). 
 Arquilla and Rasmussen attack the prevailing causal arguments one by one.  First, 
regarding misperceptions, they contend that, “the junta had almost an entire month, between 
the invasion and the onset of active operations, in which to correct its misperceptions about 
American and British behavior” (2001: 752).  Further, during that time frame both the U.S. 
and the Soviets had made it unmistakably clear that the British were “deadly serious” 
regarding their intentions to commit to war (753-55).    
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 The next point that Arquilla and Rasmussen make is couched in the language of 
“structural-level factors” (754); however, their presentation seems to be more dyadic.  They 
maintain that British global power was waning relative to that of their Argentinian rivals.  
What is more, the relative Argentinian gains were not merely the result of British decline, but 
of a bourgeoning Argentinian defense budget.  Thus, the relative shift in power parity gave 
some hope to the Argentine military that they might be poised to achieve victory in battle.   
 Another claim that the authors make stems from an organizational standpoint.  They 
assert that the “organisational pathology of the Argentine military” had caused the junta to 
“misperceive itself” (741).  This argument holds that the junta’s “true ‘constituency’” was the 
military services (741, 768).  This was an outgrowth of the nondemocratic nature of the 
military not being subordinate to civilian masters.  As well, the military inter-service 
competition had enabled dysfunction.  This consequently rendered any military tactical 
advantages impotent vis-à-vis their English counterparts (759- 760).      
 Two general points seem to arise from the Arquilla-Rasmussen argument.  For the 
sake of clarity they should be separated and explained on theoretical grounds.  First, that 
organizations in general and militaries in particular are concerned with their own 
organizational survival (760) and will pursue organizational interests even to the detriment of 
their original rationale for existence is not new (Firester, 2011: 57, 72).  Secondly, that a 
“cult of the offensive” mentality may guide first-strike proclivities, in this case a land grab, is 
a well-documented phenomenon (Van Evera, 1984).  The point that the authors make is that 
the initial assault on the Falklands/Malvinas was perpetrated by the military services, but 
then each military service was noncommittal with regard to their best military elements.  
That is, an offensive cult first advanced and later undermined by parochial inclinations to 
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protect one’s own elite service components is what Arquilla-Rasmussen contend had 
happened (2001: 763).  Witness: 
This more nuanced theory of organisations may provide the clues necessary to solving the 
puzzle of why Argentina’s military first agitated for war and then, when conflict appeared 
imminent, opted to fight while withholding their key assets safe from harm.  The crucial 
issues for the Argentine services revolve around why the army failed to send its mountain 
division to the Falklands, the air force based from the mainland rather than from the islands, 
and the navy refused to fight.  All this occurred at the same time that the junta’s military 
‘constituency’ was preventing a negotiated settlement of the 1982 crisis.    
And further that,  
 … this article adds the notion that the invasion was actually a case of preemption, in that the 
‘grab’ of the Falklands in April, at a suboptimal time of year, occurred due to fears of the deployment 
of a British naval blocking force.  (Arquilla and Rasmussen, 2001: 760). 
  In sum, the above proposition declares a systemic analysis (though largely dyadic in 
nature) to be applicable.  This is further supported by a subordinate analytical observation at 
the group level: unchecked organizational pursuits that ultimately undercut the Argentine 
junta’s ability to either backtrack or peacefully withdraw from the preemptive invasion of the 
Falklands/Malvinas.    The essential claim that Arquilla and Rasmussen make is that a 
political decision for a diversionary war is not a sufficient explanation for the Argentine 
decision to exercise its military dominion over the disputed archipelago.  Further, they 
downplay the influence of any mutual misperceptions in the period between the initial 
invasion and the full-scale war itself.   
Other Considerations 
 The explanatory power of the Arquilla-Rasmussen analysis appears to be somewhat 
superior to that of Amy Oakes.  Still, there are other factors that could be considered to be 
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minimally revealing of the British pre-war mindset.  First, in hindsight there were signs 
indicating the degree to which the Falklands/Malvinas were judged worthy of defending that 
reflect British thinking.  According to John Keegan (2003), as the British Task Force was 
gearing up for a counter-invasion (Operation Corporate) the maps upon which they had to 
rely were “from 1939 or had been photocopied from The Times Atlas” (311).  This fact 
implies two possible images of the enemy: the territory was of little significance to the 
British Crown, and the probability of an Argentine invasion was highly unlikely.  
 Secondly, there was very poor intelligence on Argentine capabilities and equipment.  
The number of French-made Super Etendard aircraft was believed to be one, when it was in 
fact five (2003: 306).  This was an important oversight, as the aircraft’s Exocet missile posed 
what would prove to be of lethal significance to the British fleet.  The British also misjudged 
the effective range of the Super Etendard.  This suggests the likelihood that the U.K. had 
believed that diplomacy would prevail and that a comprehensive understanding of the 
adversary’s full range of capabilities and equipment was less than necessary to obtain. 
Conclusion 
 Although there may have been opportunities for each side to have backed down, they 
were missed.  The preceding analyses seem to grant the presence or absence of mutual 
misperceptions as being related to the capacity to wage and successfully conclude war.  The 
essence of such assumptions are rooted in the assessment of enemy capabilities.  What is 
more difficult to ascertain –and more susceptible to misperception –is enemy intentions.  
According to Hipel (et al), one of the most prominent misunderstandings of the Argentine 
intentions beginning in 1982 was the British discounting of bellicose warnings as a result of 
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similar persistent threats (1988: 344).  This phenomenon is recognized elsewhere as “alert 
fatigue.”  In other words, even if Argentina had attempted to signal its resolve to resort to 
war, the U.K. may have become numb to previously comparable gestures.   
 The overall conclusion of this paper is inclined to believe that the 1982 South Atlantic 
War was accidental.  The reason is that given either set of arguments explored here they 
would each indicate that war could have been averted, but for dissimilar reasons it was not.   
In terms of gauging whether the cause of the conflict was the result of individual, group, 
state, or systemic dynamics it is probably safe to assess that each had mattered.  In the final 
analysis, however, it was perhaps the junta’s group-oriented influence that was most salient 
in the pursuit of staving off domestic threats to its regime survival.   
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